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1 Introduction
Normative analyses of estate taxation suggest that the case for taxing bequests is
rather weak.1 For instance, a strong case against bequest taxation comes from infinite-
horizon, Ramsey-type models. As it is well known, this kind of framework can be
interpreted as a model of individuals with a Barro-type form of altruism (Barro 1974)
who live one period, so that bequest taxation coincides with capital income taxation.
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show that in an infinite-horizon framework, the
disincentives to accumulate capital and the implied effects on the consumption stream
are so strong that the optimal capital income tax converges to zero, despite potential
benefits from redistribution across heterogeneous agents.
The Chamley–Judd result of zero capital income taxation in the limit has been
qualified by extending the neoclassical growth model to imperfect goods market com-
petition (Judd 2002), unemployment as a result of search frictions in the labor market
(Domeij 2005) and human capital formation (Jones et al. 1993, 1997).2 A nonzero
bequest tax is potentially desirable in finite horizon models as well. For instance, it
may derive from the possibility of accidental bequests (Blumkin and Sadka 2003),3
redistribution effects in heterogeneous agent models (e.g., Cremer and Pestieau 2001)
or, as pointed out by Kopczuk (2001), from negative externalities arising from wealth
inequality.
What the previous literature has in common is its focus on financial bequests as
single source of intergenerational transfers. In this paper, altruistic parents face a
trade-off between investing in their children’s education and leaving bequests. Start-
ing from a second-best world in which wage taxation distorts human capital invest-
ment, we show that taxation of intended bequests can be justified for pure efficiency
reasons. Even if the wage tax rate is held constant, introducing a bequest tax can be
Pareto-improving by enhancing incentives of parents to invest in their children’s edu-
cation. In our model, this holds when the positive effect of bequest taxation on human
capital formation is sufficiently high to outweigh the negative effects from reduced
wealth accumulation. We also provide numerical results on the optimal tax structure.
These demonstrate that with a given revenue requirement and endogenously chosen
proportional tax rates on wage income and bequests, the tax rate on bequests depends
positively on the extent of the distortion a wage tax causes on educational invest-
ments. The results also suggest that the wage tax rate should be considerably higher
than the bequest tax rate. The latter is positive when the required government revenue
1For an excellent survey of the existing literature on optimal bequest taxation under various motives to
leave financial bequests, see Cremer and Pestieau (2003).
2Judd (2002) suggests that the capital income tax should be negative if there is imperfect competition,
whereas Domeij (2005) shows that whether it should be positive or negative depends on the tightness of
the labor market. Jones et al. (1993) show that the optimal long-run tax on capital income is positive in an
endogenous growth framework where government spending is productive. Jones et al. (1997) argue that
the Chamley–Judd result also fails to hold when there are pure rents, or different types of labor which need
to be taxed at the same rate.
3Blumkin and Sadka (2003) provide an important modification of the result that accidental bequests should
fully be taxed because such a tax seemingly has lump-sum character. They show that the optimal tax on
accidental bequests is typically below 100% when labor supply is endogenous and there is wage taxation.
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in the economy is sufficiently high. If educational investment is partly unobservable
for the government, these results qualitatively hold also when allowing for education
subsidies, although these generally reduce the potentially beneficial role of positive
bequest taxation.
Our paper is probably most closely related to the recent contributions of Michel
and Pestieau (2004) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005). Like Michel and Pestieau
(2004), we analyze an optimal mix between wage taxation and bequest taxation in
a model with non-Barrovian dynasties. Whereas Michel and Pestieau (2004) assume
a “joy of giving” bequest motive and follow the existing literature by focusing on
bequests as the only form of intergenerational transfers, we assume that parents re-
ceive utility from their offsprings’ disposable income. Hence, parental utility depends
on both their financial bequests and educational investment. Focusing on a steady
state, Michel and Pestieau (2004) show that bequest taxes should typically be nega-
tive when the social planner takes into account the parental bequest motive. In con-
trast, we derive a plausible condition under which the optimal tax rate on bequests
may well be positive. Introducing a positive tax on bequests may even improve the
utility of all currently living and future generations, instead of just maximizing the
objective function of a social planner attaching certain weights on current and future
generations, without requiring a Pareto-improvement.
Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) analyze optimal linear taxes on capital and labor
income with human capital investment and financial savings. They find that the pos-
itive tax on capital income serves to alleviate distortions arising from labor income
taxation. Our paper differs from their contribution in two crucial respects. First, we
analyze an infinitely lasting OLG economy while Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) as-
sume that the economy lasts only for three periods. The positive capital income taxes
that Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) derive are in line with Jones et al. (1993) who
show that even if optimal capital income taxes would converge to zero also in the
presence of human capital formation, they are typically positive within a finite time.
We identify conditions under which bequest taxes are positive also in the steady-state.
Second, Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) do not consider intergenerational transfers or
altruism, which is the focus of this paper. Our contribution to the existing literature
thus is to examine the welfare effects of bequest taxation with finite lives when par-
ents can invest in their children’s education.4
In the coming section, we present the basic structure of the model. In Sect. 3, we
analyze the equilibrium, particularly focusing on the question under which condi-
tions bequest taxation leads to a Pareto-improvement. Section 4 provides numerical
illustrations on the optimal mix of (linear) wage and bequest taxation. Section 5 pro-
vides an extension to education subsidies and discusses the role of intergenerational
externalities due to altruism of parents for the optimal tax structure. The last section
concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4We are by far not the first ones, however, to analyze the interplay between bequests and investment in
education by parents. Blinder (1976) studies intergenerational transfers and life cycle consumption and
remarks that differential tax treatment of intergenerational transfers of human capital and bequests should
have consequences on the mix of the two. However, he does not provide a formal analysis. Ishikawa (1975)
analyzes household decisions concerning education and bequests in the absence of taxation.
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2 The model
2.1 Production of final output
In every period, a single homogeneous consumption good is produced according to a
neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Output at time t , Yt , is
Yt = F(Kt ,Ht ) ≡ Htf (kt ), kt ≡ Kt/Ht , (1)
where Kt and Ht are the amounts of physical capital and human capital em-
ployed in period t , respectively, the latter being measured in efficiency units. f (·)
is a strictly monotonically increasing and strictly concave function which fulfills
limk→∞ f ′(k) = 0 and limk→0+ f ′(k) = ∞.5
Output is sold to a perfectly competitive world market, with output price nor-
malized to unity. The rate of return to capital, rt , is internationally given and time-
invariant, i.e., rt = r¯ . That is, we analyze a small open economy framework with
perfectly mobile capital.
Profit maximization of the representative firm in any period t implies that r¯ =
f ′(kt ). Thus, kt = (f ′)−1(r¯) ≡ k¯. The wage rate per efficiency unit of human capital,
wt , reads wt = f (k¯) − k¯f ′(k¯) ≡ w¯ and output is given by Yt = Htf (k¯).
2.2 Individuals and education technology
In each period t , a unit mass of identical individuals (generation t) is born. An in-
dividual lives three periods. In the first period (childhood), individuals live by their
parents and acquire education. In the second period (working age), individuals supply
their human capital to the labor market, give birth to one child, invest in their chil-
dren’s human capital,6 and save for old age. In their final period of life (retirement
age), they allocate their wealth between consumption and transfers to their offspring,
from now on labeled “bequests.” For simplicity, suppose that the financial market is
perfect and there is no human capital risk.
An individual born in period t (a member of generation t) with parental investment
et (in units of the consumption good) in education acquires
ht+1 = h(et ), (2)
units of human capital in t + 1, where h(·) is a strictly monotonically increas-
ing and strictly concave function which fulfills h(0) ≥ 0, lime→∞ h′(e) = 0 and
lime→0+ h′(e) = ∞.7 As individuals are identical and of unit mass, the aggregate
human capital stock is given by Ht+1 = ht+1. Let st+1 denote the amount of savings
5The capital-skill complementarity underlying production function (1) is empirically well supported; see,
e.g., Goldin and Katz (1998).
6Human capital investments can be thought of as both nonschooling forms of training and private school-
ing.
7For a similar specification and a discussion of diminishing returns to human capital investment, see, e.g.,
Galor and Moav (2004), among others.
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of a member of generation t for retirement. Initially, at t = 1, both savings of the
currently old generation (born in t = −1), s0, and the education level of the current
middle-aged generation (born at t = 0), e0, are given. (Hence, the initial stock of
human capital, H1 = h(e0) is given.)
Utility Ut of a member of generation t is defined over consumption levels c2,t+1
and c3,t+2 in the working and retirement age, respectively, and disposable income of
the offspring (born in t + 1) in its working age, It+2.8 Assuming additively separable
utility, we have
Ut = u2(c2,t+1) + βV (c3,t+2, It+2), (3)
V (c3,t+2, It+2) = u3(c3,t+2) + v(It+2), (4)
where u2(·), u3(·), and v(·) are strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave
functions, and β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor. The altruism motive reflects the notion
that parents care about the economic situation of their offspring. It may be called
“joy-of-children-receiving-income,” in contrast to the often assumed “joy-of-giving”
motive. In the latter, the bequeathed amount of resources enters utility of parents
and parents do not care about other sources of children’s consumption (see Andreoni
1989, for an important early contribution on giving with impure altruism). However,
in the present context, in which parents also finance the human capital investment of
children, joy of giving would imply that parents value education per se, rather than
as a means to earn income.9
As will become apparent in Sect. 4, our “joy-of-children-receiving-income” moti-
vation gives rise to externalities of intergenerational transfers which renders nonzero
taxes optimal even if no public spending has to be financed. The reason is similar as
under a “joy-of-giving” motive. Since parents do not care about children’s utility per
se, intergenerational transfers are suboptimal from a social planner’s point of view.
Externalities from intergenerational transfers do not arise under a “dynastic” al-
truism motive as suggested by Barro (1974), in which parents care about the well
being of their offspring. In our context, this would imply a utility function of the
form Ut = u2(c2,t+1) + βu3(c3,t+2) + γUt+1, 0 < γ < 1. We do not adopt such a
utility function for two reasons. First, the Barrovian bequest motive has been criti-
cized, inter alia, because it means that individuals act as they would be infinitively-
living, as implied by the recursive definition of utility. Second, one can easily show
that with an internationally given interest rate, such a utility function rules out an
interior steady-state solution to the individual optimization problem in the proposed
overlapping-generations structure except for a knife-edge parameter constellation.
An analysis of a small open economy under perfect capital mobility is, however,
8At the cost of some notational complexity, we could introduce either an exogenous consumption for
children, or assume that the utility function of the middle-aged parents would have the family consumption
as its argument, this being optimally allocated between the parent and the child.
9Our bequest motive is linked to Gradstein and Justman (1997), who assume that parents care about the
earnings capacity of children. However, in their model, gross rather than net income of children enters
parents’ utility and parents do not leave financial bequests. Moreover, our bequest motive is related to
Blinder (1976), who assumes that the after-tax bequest enters parents’ utility function.
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becoming a more attractive reference point than a closed economy for several coun-
tries. For governments facing capital mobility, it has become increasingly difficult to
tax capital. A question which arises in this context is if taxing bequests could play a
role to avoid shifting too much of the tax burden to labor when financing the public
sector.
2.3 Public sector
The government has to finance an exogenous expenditure G ≥ 0 in each period. In
the Chamley–Judd framework, the problem of the government is to choose an optimal
intertemporal profile of wage taxes and bequest taxes to finance its expenditures over
time. While acknowledging the importance of this traditional approach, we adopt a
more challenging criterion of intertemporal Pareto-optimality: We require that each
generation has to be made better off; moreover, we assume that the government bud-
get has to be balanced each period, for the following reasons.
From normative perspective, we view the Chamley–Judd framework as fully ap-
propriate for their analysis of infinitely-lived households, but more problematic in an
overlapping generations environment. Judd (1985, 2002), Chamley (1986) and Jones
et al. (1993, 1997) conclude that it is generally optimal for the government with an
intertemporal budget constraint to levy taxes in the initial periods to establish a fund
that can be used to pay steady-state expenditures, allowing often tax rates to converge
to zero in the long run. In an overlapping generations framework, this would imply
sacrificing the utility of a potentially large number of current and future generations
to benefit the subsequent generations far away. To avoid the potentially contentious
issue of comparing welfare between different generations, we adopt the stricter test
of intergenerational Pareto-improvement.
From the positive perspective, we view the idea that a government could tax sev-
eral generations to collect a fund to benefit subsequent generations rather demand-
ing.10 Indeed, in most countries governments have accumulated net debt, rather than
even started creating large funds that would allow them to pay future expenditures
without levying taxes. As a compromise between the normative prediction by the
Chamley–Judd framework and the stylized fact that most governments do not collect
such funds, we assume that the government budget has to be balanced in each period.
Naturally, lifting such restriction would widen the scope for an intertemporal Pareto
improvement.
For the equilibrium analysis of the coming section, we follow the tradition by Judd
(1985, 2002), Chamley (1986), and Jones et al. (1993, 1997) by assuming that for
financing G the government has to use linear taxes on wages and bequests. There are
10If the results that Chamley, Judd, and Jones et al. (1993, 1997) derive in an infinitely-lived agent frame-
work would be extrapolated to a world of overlapping generations, their findings would suggest as an
optimal tax policy to levy potentially high taxes during several generations to accumulate funds that would
finally generate enough interest to allow future governments to pay for expenditures. However, such funds
could tempt generations alive in any given period in future to spend at least part of assets, rather than just
the interest that a social planner alive several generations ago intended them to receive. Furthermore, it
is not evident that current generations would be willing to sacrifice their utility to accumulate assets that
would be used to improve the standards of living after several generations.
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no other taxes. We thereby focus on interactions between wage and bequest taxation.
We consider these interactions to be the most interesting ones in our framework for
the following reasons. First, labor income taxation is the main source of government
revenue in all advanced countries. Second, as intuitive and as will become apparent,
it directly distorts human capital investment. Since the novel feature of our analysis
is to study bequest taxation in a model in which altruism of parents is reflected by
both financial bequests and educational investment, it seems natural to examine the
desirability of a positive bequest tax conditional on the extent of the distortion caused
by wage taxation. However, in Sect. 5 we discuss the additional role of education
subsidies in our framework. (For tractability reasons, these discussions are based on
numerical analyses only.) Finally, we assume that positive lump-sum taxes are non-
feasible.
3 Equilibrium analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium for given tax rates. First, individual decisions
are studied. Second, we examine the evolution of the level of human capital invest-
ment and the level of bequests. Third, and most important, we analyze the impact of
bequest taxation on individual utility. In particular, we ask: Can bequest taxation raise
welfare of all generations from the time when a bequest tax is introduced onwards?
3.1 Individual decisions
The pretax bequest received by a member of generation t in her working age (i.e., in
t +1) is denoted by bt+1. τw and τb denote the tax rates on wage income and bequest,
respectively, where τw, τb < 1. Thus, disposable income of a member of generation t
at date t + 1 is given by
It+1 = (1 − τw)w¯h(et ) + (1 − τb)bt+1 + Tt+1, (5)
where Tt+1 ≥ 0 denotes a potential lump-sum transfer. The possibility of lump-sum
transfers is introduced for a conceptual reason and will play a minor role in what
follows. It specifies that any tax revenue which may exceed G is redistributed in a
lump-sum fashion. Such tax revenue could in principle accrue when introducing a
bequest tax while holding the tax on wage income constant. As we are interested in
the question whether introducing a bequest tax may be efficiency-enhancing, we will
examine whether the impact of a marginal increase in τb on utility of each generation
around τb = 0 is positive, which effectively means that we have Tt+1 = 0 for all t .
The government budget constraint in period t + 1 is
τww¯h(et ) + τbbt+1 = G + Tt+1. (6)
Individual budget constraints at date t + 1 and t + 2 are given by
c2,t+1 + st+1 + et+1 = It+1, (7)
c3,t+2 + bt+2 = (1 + r¯)st+1, (8)
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where st+1 denotes working-life savings for retirement. Throughout the paper, we
focus on interior solutions of the utility maximization problem in each period. Using
(3)–(8), it is straightforward to show that a member of generation t in t + 1 (with
income It+1) chooses savings for her old age (st+1), educational investment for her
child (et+1) in her working age and bequests in retirement age (bt+2) according to
first-order conditions
u′2(c2,t+1)
βu′3(c3,t+2)
= 1 + r¯ , (9)
u′2(c2,t+1)
βv′(It+2)
= (1 − τw)w¯h′(et+1), (10)
and
u′3(c3,t+2)
v′(It+2)
= 1 − τb, (11)
respectively. Optimality condition (9) is standard: the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween present and future consumption is equal to the interest rate factor. According
to (10), the marginal rate of substitution between present consumption and children’s
income equals the marginal (net) return of children to human capital investment,
whereas (11) says that the marginal rate of substitution between future consump-
tion and (future) bequests equals the net receiving of children per unit of bequests,
1 − τb.
For later use, note that parental decisions imply that a member of generation t
receives income
It+1 = w¯h(et ) + bt+1 − G (12)
in t + 1, according to (5) and (6).11
3.2 Educational investments
We first look at educational investments. By combining (9)–(11) and observing the
properties of education technology h(e), it is easy to see that the following results
hold.
Proposition 1 (Education) For any t ≥ 1, human capital investment, et ≡ e∗(τb, τw),
is time-invariant, unique, and implicitly given by
(1 − τw)w¯h′(e∗) = (1 − τb)(1 + r¯). (13)
Corollary 1 Educational investment e∗ and thus, for all t ≥ 1 equilibrium output,
Yt+1 = h(e∗)f (k¯) ≡ Y ∗, are increasing in τb and decreasing in τw .
11Note that combining (8), (11), and (12) implies u′3((1+ r¯)s0 −b1) = (1− τb)v′(w¯h(e0)+b1 − G¯), i.e.,
bequest b1 left by members of the initially old generation is determined by initial conditions: investment
e0 in their offspring’s education and savings s0 in their working age.
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According to Proposition 1, the optimal educational investment, e∗, is reached
when the marginal after-tax return to education equals the after-tax return on one
unit of bequest when invested in the financial market. An important implication of
this is that e∗, and thus the gross domestic product, Y ∗, is increasing in the degree of
bequest taxation (Corollary 1). This is because an increase in τb induces parents, who
care about net income of their offspring, to substitute away from financial transfers (in
retirement age) and invest more in children’s education (in working age). This result
is novel in the literature on bequest taxation. The other result—that higher earnings
taxation (i.e., an increase in τw) reduces incentives to invest in education—is standard
and straightforward.
3.3 Bequest taxation and efficiency
We now turn to the question whether bequest taxation can lead to a Pareto-
improvement. In the remainder of this section, we consider the impact on utility of
introducing a small tax on bequests levied from period 2 onwards and announced in
period 1. As already indicated, the wage tax rate τw is kept constant throughout this
analysis. Note that this is a rather demanding test for the desirability of a bequest tax
as we could alternatively assume that at the same time the wage tax could be lowered
when marginally increasing τb. We find (as proven, like all subsequent formal results,
in the Appendix)
Lemma 1 By levying a small bequest tax from period 2 onwards, (i) the currently
middle-aged generation unambiguously gains (is unaffected) if τw > (=)0, and
(ii) a Pareto-improvement occurs if and only if
1 + r¯ + τw
1 − τw
∂e∗
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
+ ∂bt+1
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
≥ 0 (14)
for t ≥ 1.12
For the initially middle-aged generation, income (I1) is not affected by the bequest
tax from period 2 onwards. (Consequently, also utility of the initially old generation
is unaffected.) Given that human capital investment is distorted (τw > 0) utility of
members of the initially middle-aged generation increases after introducing a small
bequest tax τb . This is because human capital investment rises (Corollary 1), which
positively affects their offspring’s income. Regarding the generations born after the
initially middle-aged, two potentially counteracting effects are relevant. The first one
is again the unambiguously positive impact of τb on e∗(τb, τw), according to Corol-
lary 1. However, the effect on welfare also depends on how the bequests received
from parents are affected. Thus, if the amount of intergenerational transfers declines,
utility may decline after introducing bequest taxation despite the positive effect from
an increase in human capital investments. Hence, a priori, it is not clear whether
12Note that evaluating at τb = 0 means that no revenue is generated from bequest taxation.
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bequest taxes can raise welfare of all generations. The positive impact of bequest tax-
ation on human capital formation has to be weighted against the potential reduction
in bequests.
When the optimal bequest tax is positive, its intuition can be summarized as fol-
lows. In absence of a bequest tax, a positive tax on labor distorts the composition
of intergenerational transfers in favor of bequests. Thus, parents will invest too lit-
tle in their children’s education. To reduce this distortion in educational investment,
the government may levy a bequest tax.13 Starting from a zero tax rate on financial
bequests, introducing a bequest tax—although generating a distortion in the level of
bequests—also alleviates the distortion in the composition of intergenerational trans-
fers. At least a small positive tax on bequests would be optimal as the new distortion
it generates is of second-order relative to the initial distortion it alleviates.
As general conclusions are difficult to obtain, we attempt to gain insight into this
issue from an example which allows explicit analytical solutions. From now on, we
consider utility specifications
u2(c) = u3(c) = ln c and v(I ) = ln(I − χ), (15)
where χ > 0 may be interpreted as “subsistence income” of children from the per-
spective of parents. It is a measure of the strength of the bequest motive. To simplify
further, let us also employ the standard specification
β(1 + r¯) = 1. (16)
Moreover, let us define
∗(τb, τw) ≡ (1 + β)χ − (β + τb)
(
w¯h
(
e∗(τb, τw)
) − G)
− (1 − τb)e∗(τb, τw), (17)
0(τb, τw) ≡ (1 + β)χ + (β + τb)G − (1 + β)w¯h
(
e∗(τb, τw)
)
+ (1 − τb)
[
w¯h(e0) − e∗(τb, τw)
]
. (18)
Note that both expressions are positive if χ is sufficiently large, which is assumed for
the next result.
Lemma 2 Under specifications (15) and (16), if ∗ > 0 and 0 > 0, then the evolu-
tion of bequests is characterized by
b2 = 0(τb, τw)1 + β + β(1 − τb) + c(τb)b1 ≡ B0(b1; τb, τw) (19)
and for t ≥ 1,
bt+2 = 
∗(τb, τw)
1 + β + β(1 − τb) + c(τb)bt+1 ≡ B
∗(bt+1; τb, τw), (20)
13Note that we do not allow for positive externalities of human capital formation (which could generate
endogenous growth). Rather, the only distortion of educational investments comes from wage taxation.
Assuming instead that positive externalities from education exist would make a positive tax on bequests
even more desirable.
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where
c(τb) ≡ 1 − τb1 + β + β(1 − τb) < 1. (21)
Thus, intergenerational transfers converge to steady state level
b∗(τb, τw) ≡ 
∗(τb, τw)
2β + τb(1 − β) > 0. (22)
The assumptions in Lemma 2 thus imply that a unique and stable steady state with
a positive amount of bequest exists. In order to examine the dynamic process and
the welfare implications of introducing a bequest tax, we suppose that the economy
is initially in a steady state with no bequest taxation (τb = 0). That is, defining rev-
enue from wage income taxation as Rw(τb, τw) ≡ τww¯h(e∗(τb, τw), we set the wage
tax rate at τw = τ 0w as given by Rw(0, τ 0w) = G; hence, we have initial conditions
e0 = e∗(0, τ 0w) and b1 = b∗(0, τ 0w). The next result implies that to establish a Pareto-
improvement we only need to check whether the introduction of a bequest tax in t = 1
benefits the initially young generation (i.e., raises U1) and the steady state generation
(i.e., raises Ut as t → ∞).
Lemma 3 Assume e0 = e∗(0, τ 0w) and b1 = b∗(0, τ 0w). Under the assumptions of
Lemma 2, announcing in period t = 1 that a small tax is levied on bequests from
period 2 onwards generates an intertemporal Pareto-improvement if and only if con-
dition (14) holds for both t = 1 and t → ∞.
Recall from Lemma 1 that a Pareto-improvement is obtained when the amount of
bequest is not reduced too much in response to the introduction of the bequest tax
from period 2 onward. Figure 1 shows the evolution of bequests after introduction of
the bequest tax. Let bˆ be the level of bequest such that, when starting at bˆ in period 1,
bequests immediately jump to the steady state level b∗ in period 2. If b1 < bˆ, the
amount of bequests increases over time from period 2 onward. Thus, if the generation
which is middle-aged when the bequest tax is introduced does not reduce bequests
b2 too much, so that generation 1 is made better off, all generations are made better
off. That is, if condition (14) holds for t = 1, it holds for all t > 1 as well. In contrast,
if b1 > bˆ, bequests decrease over time from period 2 onward, eventually reaching
steady state value b∗ (point A in Fig. 1). Thus, if b∗ is not reduced too much by
the bequest tax, also bequests during the transition to the steady state will decline
sufficiently little so to leave every generation better off.
To obtain explicit characterizations in what follows, we further specify
h(e) = e1/2. (23)
Then (13) and (16) imply that
eˆ∗ =
[
β(1 − τw)
2(1 − τb)
]2
, (24)
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Fig. 1 The evolution of bequests, illustrated for the case b∗ < b1 < bˆ
where we use the notation xˆ ≡ x/w¯2 when a variable (or parameter) x is ad-
justed by w¯2. Using (23), the tax revenue from labor income taxation is given by
Rw = τww¯2(eˆ∗)1/2. Thus, the wage tax rate which finances Gˆ = G/w¯2 in absence of
bequest taxation is given by14
τ 0w = 0.5
(
1 −
√
1 − 8Gˆ
β
)
≡ τ˜ 0w(Gˆ). (25)
Lemma 4 Under specifications (15), (16), and (23):
(i) ∗(0, τ 0w) > 0 if and only if χˆ > 0.75β2(1 − τ˜ 0w(Gˆ))2/(1 + β) ≡ f (Gˆ).
(ii) For both t = 1 and t → ∞, ∂bt+1/∂τb|τb=0 < 0.
For Lemma 2, we assumed that ∗(τb, τw) > 0 to obtain a positive steady state
level of financial bequests, b∗(τb, τw). Part (i) of Lemma 4 shows that this condi-
tion indeed holds for our specifications, given that there is no bequest taxation, if
the bequest motive, measured by “adjusted” subsistence income, χˆ = χ/w¯2, is suf-
ficiently strong. The relevant threshold, f (Gˆ), is decreasing in τ 0w . Thus, if human
capital investment is not always more attractive than financial bequests, which may
the case if τ 0w is low, then there is a steady state where parents use both ways to be-
queath, investing in education and transferring financial wealth. Part (ii) implies that
14It is easy to see that the economy is on the downward-sloping part of the Laffer curve with respect to
revenue from labor income taxation (i.e., ∂Rw/∂τw < 0) if and only if τw > 0.5. There are two solutions
to Rw(0, τ0w) = G. Equation (25) shows the smaller root, as for the larger root τ0w > 0.5 holds.
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intergenerational transfers decline in all periods after introduction of a small bequest
tax.
We are now ready to study under which circumstances the introduction of a
bequest tax, despite its negative effect on the level of bequests leads to a Pareto-
improvement.
Proposition 2 Assume χˆ > f (Gˆ) and initially e0 = e∗(0, τ 0w), b1 = b∗(0, τ 0w). Un-
der specifications (15), (16), and (23), levying a small bequest tax improves welfare
of each generation if Gˆ ≥ Gˆ, where Gˆ is implicitly given by
2Gˆ(1 + 5β + 8β2)
β(1 + β) − 0.5
(
1 +
√
1 − 8Gˆ
β
)
− 4(1 − β)χˆ
β2
= 0. (26)
Gˆ is increasing in χˆ .
Proposition 2 suggests that a positive bequest tax may be efficiency-enhancing
even if not used to lower the wage tax. This desirability of a distorting new tax arises
in an initial steady state with labor income taxation only,15 if the public expendi-
ture level and, therefore, the initial wage tax rate are sufficiently high (τ 0w > τ˜w(Gˆ)).
The reason is that for τ 0w > τ˜w(Gˆ) the human capital investment decision is severely
distorted by labor income taxation and, therefore, the incentive to raise educational
investment may dominate the effect from a reduction in the amount of bequests on
utility. For instance, suppose β = 0.9 and χˆ = 0.5. In this case, τ˜w(Gˆ) ∼= 20.8%.
If β = 0.9 and χˆ = 1, then τ˜w(Gˆ) ∼= 26.5%. This shows that bequest taxation may
be optimal at rather moderate wage taxation, even when leaving the wage tax un-
changed. Note that for given χˆ , the adjusted threshold for public expenditure, Gˆ, is
independent of w¯2 and, therefore, τ˜w(Gˆ) is independent of the wage level. A higher
χˆ raises threshold expenditure Gˆ since it positively affects the equilibrium level of fi-
nancial bequest (which is distorted by bequest taxation) for any period, while leaving
educational investment unchanged.
4 Optimal tax structure
In the previous section, we proved that introducing a small bequest tax may raise
welfare of all generations, even if the wage tax rate is kept constant. In this section,
we analyze what would be an optimally chosen combination of wage and bequest
taxation (in absence of lump-sum transfers), with a given government revenue re-
quirement. To abstract from transition issues, we focus on maximizing the utility of
steady-state generations,16 assuming that the government budget is balanced in each
period. That is, τww¯h(e∗) + τbb∗ = G holds.
15Assumption χˆ > f (Gˆ) implies b1 > 0, according to Lemma 2 and part (i) of Lemma 4.
16As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, introducing a small bequest tax leads to a Pareto improvement
if it benefits the steady state generation. This suggests that all generations are made better off under the
optimal tax mix for steady state generations, compared to a situation where there is only wage taxation.
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According to (3), (4), (12), (7), and (8), the social planner’s objective function is
then given by
U∗ ≡ u2
(
w¯h(e∗) + b∗ − G − s∗ − e∗) + βu3
(
(1 + r¯)s∗ − b∗)
+ βv(w¯h(e∗) + b∗ − G). (27)
Under specifications (15), (16), and (23), up to an additive constant this is equivalent
to
Uˆ∗ ≡ ln(√eˆ∗ + bˆ∗ − Gˆ − sˆ∗ − eˆ∗) + β ln
(
sˆ∗
β
− bˆ∗
)
+ β ln(√eˆ∗ + bˆ∗ − Gˆ). (28)
From (22),
bˆ∗ = (1 + β)χˆ − (β + τb)(
√
eˆ∗ − Gˆ) − (1 − τb)eˆ∗
2β + τb(1 − β) . (29)
Moreover, using first-order condition (9) together with (7), (8), and (12), it is easy to
see that
sˆ∗ = β
1 + β
(√
eˆ∗ + 2bˆ∗ − Gˆ − eˆ∗). (30)
Together with (24), (28)–(30) show that the optimal solution to the social planner’s
problem is independent of wage rate w¯, provided that χ is proportional to w¯2.
Table 1 shows numerical results for the optimal tax rates (τ optw , τ optb ) ≡
arg max(τw,τb) Uˆ∗ s.t. τw(eˆ∗)1/2 + τbbˆ∗ = Gˆ, for χˆ ∈ {0.5,1} and β = 0.9, condi-
tional on the (adjusted) government expenditure level, Gˆ. We also report the ratio
of financial bequests to wage income, bˆ∗/
√
eˆ∗, under both regimes without bequest
taxation (i.e., (τw, τb) = (τ 0w,0)) and under the optimal tax mix, (τ optw , τ optb ); we use
notation (bˆ∗/
√
eˆ∗)0 and (bˆ∗/
√
eˆ∗)opt, respectively. Moreover, we report the implied
ratio of government expenditure as fraction of the gross national product (GNP),
initially and under the optimal tax mix, denoted by g0 and g, respectively.17
Our numerical results again suggest that the optimal bequest tax rate is gener-
ally positive when the (adjusted) government revenue requirement, Gˆ, is sufficiently
high. This is consistent with the intuition of Proposition 2: Using bequest taxes can
raise efficiency when an excessive use of a wage tax would be too distorting. With
a low revenue requirement, however, it is optimal to moderately tax wages and use
tax revenue to subsidize bequests. Moreover, also when Gˆ is high, the optimal be-
quest tax rate is significantly lower than the wage tax rate. The intuition for these
results is the following. Investment in human capital exhibits decreasing returns to
scale, while financial markets provide constant returns to scale. At the same time
as taxing wages reduces investment in human capital, it also increases the rate of
return to marginal investment. This partly counteracts the distortion created by the
tax wedge. When the government chooses tax rates to balance marginal distortions
17GNP equals the sum of wage income and interest income from savings, GNP = w¯h(e∗) + r¯s∗. Our
specifications imply that G/GNP = Gˆ/(√eˆ∗ + 1−ββ sˆ∗).
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Table 1 Social optimum in the
steady state—numerical results
(in percent for τw , τb, and g);
β = 0.9
Gˆ τ0w τ
opt
w τ
opt
b
( bˆ
∗√
eˆ∗ )
0 ( bˆ
∗√
eˆ∗ )
opt g0 g
0 0 5.6 −8.4 0.42 0.66 0 0
0.02 4.7 8.1 −4.6 0.52 0.66 4.3 4.6
0.04 9.9 10.5 −0.8 0.63 0.65 9.0 9.1
0.06 15.8 13.0 2.9 0.76 0.65 14.3 13.6
0.08 23.1 15.4 6.5 0.95 0.65 20.6 18.0
0.10 33.3 17.8 10.0 1.26 0.65 28.9 22.4
(a) χˆ = 0.5
Gˆ τ0w τ
opt
w τ
opt
b
( bˆ
∗√
eˆ∗ )
0 ( bˆ
∗√
eˆ∗ )
opt g0 g
0 0 6.1 −3.3 1.60 1.87 0 0
0.02 4.7 7.4 −1.3 1.75 1.87 3.8 4.0
0.04 9.9 8.6 0.6 1.93 1.87 8.0 7.9
0.06 15.8 9.8 2.5 2.16 1.87 12.7 11.8
0.08 23.1 11.0 4.3 2.74 1.87 18.0 14.5
0.10 33.3 12.2 6.1 3.02 1.88 24.9 17.9
(b) χˆ = 1
from collecting any given revenue, it is optimal to distort human capital investment
relatively more. For the same reason, when G is low, taxing the return to education
and subsidizing bequests may improve the welfare of the steady-state generations by
encouraging parents to transfer in aggregate more resources to their children. Also
note that optimal tax rates are nonzero even in the case where Gˆ = 0. Why an op-
timal tax on bequests could be negative (and, therefore, the optimal wage tax pos-
itive) even when there is no public sector? The answer relies on intergenerational
externalities that intergenerational transfers generate. Each generation chooses the
level of transfers to the subsequent generation taking into account only its own joy-
of-children-receiving. Subsidizing financial bequests encourages more giving while
taxing wages introduces a negative distortion. A priori, there is no reason why the
social planner should abstain doing the former in order to avoid the latter, given that
returns to education are diminishing.
We can also see from Table 1 how the size of financial bequests relative to wage
income depends on public expenditure. In the absence of bequest taxation, increasing
the tax rate on labor income results in parents transferring relatively more resources
through bequests. In the examples we report, in the absence of bequest taxes, the size
of bequests varies between 42 and 126% of the lifetime wage income with χˆ = 0.5,
and between 160 and 302% with χˆ = 1. When the bequest tax rate is set optimally,
the range is 65 to 66% with χˆ = 0.5 and 187 to 188% with χˆ = 1. This suggests
that optimal taxation stabilizes the composition of intergenerational transfers when
the general level of public expenditures changes.18
18The same holds with respect to educational investment and, therefore, with respect to GDP, Y ∗ =
h(e∗)f (k¯). These insights are also valid for the extensions in the coming section.
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According to the last two columns, for sufficiently high public spending levels,
GNP is clearly higher under the optimal tax mix than in the case where bequest
taxation is not available, which implies g < g0. Moreover, comparing panels (a) and
(b) of Table 1 suggests that a higher desired income level for children, χˆ , reduces the
ratio of public expenditure to GNP as well as the level of g0 above which the optimal
bequest tax becomes positive. The results suggest that bequest tax rates should be
positive already at moderate levels of the ratio of government expenditure to GNP.
5 Discussion and extensions
5.1 Optimal tax mix with education subsidies
So far, we have abstracted from the instrument of education subsidies for stimulating
educational investment. Partly, this may be justified because human capital invest-
ments are often unobservable to tax authorities, in a similar manner as the optimal
tax literature typically posits that work effort is not observable.19 We will now ex-
tend our analysis to allow for subsidies on partly observable education expenditure.
For this purpose, suppose each unit of investment in education, e, is subsidized by a
constant rate τe. However, the effective subsidy rate is restricted to τe ≤ τ¯e < 1. For
instance, if the government can levy a subsidy rate of up to 100% for observed edu-
cation expenditure and only 50% of total expenditure e is observable, then τ¯e = 0.5.
Individual budget constraints at date t + 1 and t + 2 are again given by (7) and (8)
where now net income is It+1 = (1 − τw)w¯h(et ) + (1 − τb)bt+1 + τeet+1. Whereas
first-order conditions associated with the individual optimization problem (9) and
(11) remain the same, (10) changes to
u′2(c2,t+1)
βv′(It+2)
= 1 − τw
1 − τe w¯h
′(et+1). (31)
Thus, (13) becomes
1 − τw
1 − τe w¯h
′(e∗) = (1 − τb)(1 + r¯), (32)
i.e., a higher subsidy rate τe raises educational investment. The government bud-
get constraint now includes payments for the education subsidy; it is given by
τww¯h(et )+τbbt+1 = G+τeet+1 (like in the previous section, we focus on Tt+1 = 0).
Net income is thus still given by (12).
Before we analyze the optimal tax mix cum education subsidy, suppose first that
there is no bequest taxation. If the social planner is constrained to τb = 0, then the
optimal tax policy is to set τw = τe = τ such that G is financed, irrespective of our
specification of functional forms. In this case, there is no distortion of educational
19Trostel (1993) estimates that a substantial fraction of the costs of education are nonverifiable, even when
abstracting from any effort costs. In their paper on human capital investment and capital income taxation,
Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) find that taxing capital income is optimal with subsidies to human capital
investment when at least a share of these investments is nonverifiable.
Pareto-improving bequest taxation 663
Table 2 Social optimum in the
steady state with education
subsidy—numerical results;
β = 0.9, χˆ = 1
Note: τ¯e is also the optimal
educational subsidy for social
planner’s problem (34)
Gˆ τ¯e τ
opt
w τ
opt
b
g
0 0.25 25.9 −7.9 0
0.05 0.25 27.6 −2.8 9.7
0.1 0.25 30.3 2.0 19.3
0.15 0.25 33.0 6.7 28.8
0 0.5 45.9 −13.7 0
0.05 0.5 48.0 −8.3 9.5
0.1 0.5 50.3 −3.1 19.1
0.15 0.5 52.4 2.0 28.5
investment. Hence, if τw = τe = τ under τb = 0, then taxation has the same impact
as lump-sum taxation. We will now show that in steady state τw = τe = τ may not be
optimal, however, if taxing (or subsidizing) bequests is feasible.
Using β(1 + r¯) = 1 and h(e) = e1/2, we obtain
eˆ∗ =
[
β(1 − τw)
2(1 − τb)(1 − τe)
]2
. (33)
Again focusing on the steady state and using specification (15), the objective func-
tion of the social planner remains Uˆ∗, as defined in (28), where bˆ∗ and sˆ∗ are still
given by (29) and (30), respectively.20 Under partial unobservability of educational
investments, the social planner’s problem now is
max
τb,τw,τe
Uˆ∗
s.t. τw(eˆ∗)1/2 + τbbˆ∗ = Gˆ + τeeˆ∗, τe ≤ τ¯e.
(34)
As a first robust numerical result, we find that it is optimal to fully subsidize ed-
ucation, i.e., under partial unobservability of educational investment, to choose the
maximal effective education subsidy, τ¯e. In Table 2, we report the optimal tax mix
(τw, τb) as well as the implied ratio of public spending to GNP, g, conditional on Gˆ,
for τ¯e ∈ {0.25,0.5}, β = 0.9 and χˆ = 1.
The results suggest that the bequest tax rate is generally nonzero, being negative
if Gˆ is low and positive if Gˆ is high. The threshold level of public spending which
calls for positive taxation of bequests clearly depends on the fraction of educational
investment which is observable, as generally observed education spending should be
fully subsidized. In fact, education subsidies should be paid even when the govern-
ment revenue requirement is zero, implying a rather high wage tax to finance both
education subsidies and bequest subsidies.
Thus, it is clearly the case that the availability of education subsidies significantly
weakens the beneficial role of positive bequest taxation and even calls for higher be-
quest subsidies in case of low revenue requirements. However, there may be reasons
20Recall that first-order conditions (9) and (11) hold with and without education subsidy and that net
income is still given by (12).
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why wage taxes cannot be raised to a level which finances both an optimal educa-
tion subsidy and a subsidy on bequests, like international labor mobility. Suppose
that for exogenous reasons there is an upper bound to labor taxation, τ¯w , but no limit
on education subsidies. One can show that in this case, there is an interior solution
τe ∈ (0,1), and again we have τ optb < 0 if Gˆ is low and τ optb > 0 if Gˆ is high (results
available upon request). This suggests that a government which operates under con-
straints for either wage taxation or subsidization of education should well consider
taxing bequests if the revenue requirement is high.
5.2 Social optimum without the altruistic component
In the optimal tax literature, the altruistic component is sometimes laundered out in
the social planner’s objective function. How does the optimal tax mix change as a
consequence?21 Replacing Uˆ∗ by
ln
(√
eˆ∗ + bˆ∗ − Gˆ − sˆ∗ − eˆ∗) + β ln
(
sˆ∗
β
− bˆ∗
)
and leaving out education subsidies, we obtain numerical results for the steady state
as summarized in Table 3.
As already discussed in Sect. 4, nonzero tax rates in the case where there is no
public revenue requirement are called for only if the social planner takes intergen-
erational externalities due to altruism of parents into account. A striking contrast to
Sect. 4 is that now the optimal bequest tax rate, τ optb , is always positive and not sub-
stantially lower than the wage tax τ optw .
It is important to note, however, that allowing the social planner to choose an ed-
ucation subsidy, τe, like in the previous subsection, leaves the basic insights of our
discussion above unchanged. That is, education should be subsidized at rate τ¯e and
an efficiency-enhancing role of positive bequest taxes requires that either a substan-
tial fraction of educational investment is unobservable (implying that τ¯e is low) or
that there is a binding constraint for the wage tax (τ¯w). (Results are available upon
request.)
Table 3 Social optimum in the
steady state without altruistic
component in objective
function—numerical results;
β = 0.9, χˆ = 1, τe = 0
Gˆ τ
opt
w τ
opt
b
g
0 0 0 0
0.02 2.6 1.2 3.6
0.04 4.2 2.9 7.5
0.06 5.8 4.6 11.3
0.08 7.3 6.3 15.0
0.1 8.9 7.9 18.6
0.12 10.4 9.6 22.5
0.14 11.9 11.2 26.2
21We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting to address this question.
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6 Conclusion
Altruistic parents may transfer resources to their offspring by providing education
and by leaving bequests. Parental altruism is often seen as an argument against be-
quest taxation, the reason being that bequest taxation would distort the accumulation
of capital intergenerationally in the same way as capital income taxation would distort
consumption profile and savings over the individual life cycle. In this paper, we show
that this intuition needs no longer hold true in the presence of education and wage
taxation. Wage taxes reduce the rate of return that children receive on parental invest-
ments in education. This induces parents, who value the after-tax resources that their
children receive, to reduce investment in education, and leave bequests instead. We
show that a small bequest tax may improve efficiency in an overlapping-generations
framework with only intended bequests, even when the wage tax remains unchanged.
This is because the bequest tax may mitigate the distortion of educational investment
caused by wage taxation.
In addition to deriving a general criterion for the desirability of a small bequest tax
when the wage tax rate is left unchanged, we also analyze what would be an optimal
mix of wage taxes and bequest taxes with given government revenue requirement.
Certain clear patterns emerge. First of all, the optimal bequest tax is generally positive
when the government revenue requirement is sufficiently high, although always lower
than the wage tax rate. This may hold true even if governments are also able to levy
education subsidies, provided that these are limited due to the partial unobservability
of education expenditure. In any case, our results suggest that bequest taxation may
be efficiency-enhancing if education subsidies are low. Moreover, the case for taxing
bequests is strengthened if the social planner does not take into account the altruistic
motive of parents.
Our results have certain surprising implications for the US debate on estate tax-
ation, which centers around the conventional wisdom that taxation of intended be-
quests gives rise to a typical equity-efficiency trade-off (see Gale and Slemrod 2001,
for a review of the debate). Currently, descendants of only 2% of Americans who die
pay estate taxes. Even proponents of the estate tax are willing to raise the exempted
amount further. We find that this policy, while popular, need not be optimal even from
an efficiency point of view. It might well be optimal to tax also smaller bequests, pos-
sibly at a relatively low rate, and use the tax revenue to lower wage taxes. Such policy
would boost the incentives of altruistic parents among the currently exempted 98%
of population to transfer resources to their children more through education.
In this paper, we deliberately abstracted from distributional issues, in order to
highlight the efficiency argument in favor of bequest taxation. An important topic for
future research would be to introduce heterogeneity with respect to learning abilities
and/or initial wealth of households as well as stochastic components in the transmis-
sion of abilities from parent to child. For instance, one could study the evolution of
the distribution of income and wealth and how it is affected by the tax instruments.
Such analyses would call for a computational model with a suitably calibrated distri-
bution of various shocks.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Part (i) is proven first. Note that the currently middle-aged gener-
ation is born in t = 0. Also note from (12) that their income, I1, is initially given, as
e0 and b1 (the latter depending on both e0 and s0) are given. Observing e1 = e∗, we
have
U0 = u2(I1 − s1 − e∗) + βu3
(
(1 + r¯)s1 − b2
) + βv(w¯h(e∗) + b2 − G
)
, (A.1)
according to (3), (4), (12), (7), and (8). Differentiating with respect to τb , using
(by applying the envelope theorem) both u′2(c2,1) = (1 + r¯)βu′3(c3,2) and v′(I2) =
u′3(c3,2)/(1 − τb), according to (9) and (11), and finally, using w¯h′(e∗)/(1 − τb) =
(1 + r¯)/(1 − τw), according to (13), leads to
∂U0
∂τb
= βu′3(c3,2)
[
(1 + r¯) τw
1 − τw
∂e∗
∂τb
+ τb
1 − τb
∂b2
∂τb
]
. (A.2)
Thus, ∂U0/∂τb|τb=0 > (=)0 if τw > (=)0, according to Corollary 1. This confirms
part (i).
We now turn to part (ii). Utility of generation t ≥ 1 is
Ut = u2
(
w¯h(et ) + bt+1 − G − st+1 − et+1
)
+ βu3
(
(1 + r¯)st+1 − bt+2
) + βv(w¯h(et+1) + bt+2 − G
)
. (A.3)
Taking into account that et+1 = e∗ for all t ≥ 0 stays the same, differentiating and
using first-order condition (10) w.r.t. st+1 gives
∂Ut
∂τb
= u′2w¯h′
∂e∗
∂τb
+ u′2
∂bt+1
∂τb
− u′2
∂e∗
∂τb
− βu′3
∂bt+2
∂τb
+ βv′w¯h′ ∂e
∗
∂τb
+ βv′ ∂bt+2
∂τb
.
(A.4)
Using again the first-order conditions associated with the individual optimization
problem, this simplifies as
∂Ut
∂τb
= (1 + r¯)βu′3w¯h′
∂e∗
∂τb
+ (1 + r¯)βu′3
∂bt+1
∂τb
− (1 + r¯)βu′3
∂e∗
∂τb
− βu′3
∂bt+2
∂τb
+ β u
′
3
1 − τb w¯h
′ ∂e∗
∂τb
+ β u
′
3
1 − τb
∂bt+2
∂τb
. (A.5)
We obtain condition (14) by using (13), factoring out β(1 + r¯)u′3 and evaluating at
τb = 0. 
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Proof of Lemma 2 Substituting c2,t+1 = It+1 − st+1 − et+1 and c3,t+2 =
(1 + r¯)st+1 − bt+2 from (7) and (8), respectively, into (9), and using u2(c) = u3(c) =
ln c, leads to
st+1 = β(1 + r¯)(It+1 − et+1) + bt+2
(1 + r¯)(1 + β) (A.6)
for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, substituting c3,t+2 = (1 + r¯)st+1 − bt+2 from (8)
into (11), and using u3(c) = ln c and v(I ) = ln(I − χ) yields It+2 − χ =
(1−τb)[(1+ r¯)st+1 −bt+2]. Substituting (12) and (A.6) into this expression and using
both et+1 = e∗ for t ≥ 0 and β(1 + r¯) = 1 from specification (16) implies that be-
quests evolve over time according to (19) and (20). As c(τb) < 1, the dynamic process
governing the evolution of bequests is stable. Finally, setting bt+1 = bt+2 ≡ b∗
in (20), observing (21) and solving for b∗ gives us (22). This concludes the
proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3 If τb > 0, then e0 < e∗(τb, τ 0w), according to Corollary 1. Con-
sequently, we have 0(τb, τw) < ∗(τb, τw), according to (17) and (18), and thus,
B0(b; ·) < B∗(b; ·), according to (19) and (20). Figure 1 depicts b2 = B0(b1; ·) as
dashed line and bt+2 = B∗(bt+1; ·) as solid line for τb > 0. The steady state level
of bequest with τb > 0, b∗, is given by point A. Let bˆ be given by B0(bˆ; ·) = b∗.
Now if b1 < bˆ as in Fig. 1, then b2 < b∗ and, for all t ≥ 1, bt+2 increases over
time to b∗. In this case, if condition (14) holds for t = 1, it also holds for all t > 1.
If b1 = bˆ, then b2 = bt+2 = b∗ for all t ≥ 1. Finally, if b1 > bˆ, then b2 > b∗ and,
for all t ≥ 1, bt+2 decreases over time to b∗. In this case, if condition (14) holds
for t → ∞ (i.e., for bt+1 = b∗), it also holds for all t ≥ 1. This concludes the
proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4 First, note that
b∗
(
0, τ 0w
) = (1 + β)χ − β(1 − τ
0
w)w¯h(e
∗(0, τ 0w)) − e∗(0, τ 0w)
2β
, (A.7)
according to (17), (22), and (by definition of τ 0w) w¯h(e∗(0, τ 0w)) − G =
(1 − τ 0w)w¯h(e∗(0, τ 0w)). Using h(e) = e1/2 and substituting e∗(0, τw) = [β(1 −
τw)w¯]2/4 from (24) into (A.7) leads to
b∗
(
0, τ 0w
) = (1 + β)χ − 3e
∗(0, τ 0w)
2β
. (A.8)
Part (i) follows by using (24). To confirm part (ii), take partial derivatives of (22)
and (19) with respect to τb , by using (17) and (18), respectively. By evaluating the
resulting expressions at (τb, τw) = (0, τ 0w) and noting that
∂e∗(τb, τw)
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
= 2e∗(0, τw), (A.9)
668 V. Grossmann, P. Poutvaara
according to (24), we obtain
∂b∗(τb, τ 0w)
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
= −
(1 − τ 0w)w¯h(e∗(0, τ 0w)) + (2 2−τ
0
w
1−τ 0w − 1)e
∗(0, τ 0w) + (1 − β)b∗(0, τ 0w)
2β
(A.10)
and
∂B0(b1; τb, τ 0w)
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
= −
(1 − τ 0w)w¯h(e∗(0, τ 0w)) + (2 1+β(2−τ
0
w)
β(1−τ 0w) − 1)e
∗(0, τ 0w) + (1 − β)b1
1 + 2β .
(A.11)
Both derivatives are negative. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 222 According to Lemma 3 and the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 2, a Pareto-improvement is reached if
∗ ≡
1
β
+ τ 0w
1 − τ 0w
∂e∗(τb, τ 0w)
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
+ ∂b
∗(τb, τ 0w)
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
≥ 0 (A.12)
and
0 ≡
1
β
+ τ 0w
1 − τ 0w
∂e∗(τb, τ 0w)
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
+ ∂B0(b
∗(0, τ 0w); τb, τ 0w)
∂τb
∣
∣
∣
∣
τb=0
≥ 0 (A.13)
simultaneously hold. It is tedious but straightforward to show that substituting (A.9)
and (A.10) into (A.12) and using b1 = b∗(0, τ 0w) as given in (A.8) implies
∗ = 1 + β
4β2
(
e0
1 − τ 0w
[
qτ 0w − 1
] − (1 − β)χ
)
, (A.14)
where q ≡ (1 + 5β + 8β2)/(1 + β). Similarly, substituting (A.9) and (A.11) into
(A.13) and using (A.8) implies
0 = 1 + β2β(1 + 2β)
(
e0
1 − τ 0w
[
(1 + 8β)τ 0w − 1
] − (1 − β)χ
)
. (A.15)
Note that q < 1 + 8β . Thus, if ∗ ≥ 0, then 0 > 0. Substituting e0 =
[β(1 − τw)w¯/2]2 into (A.14), we find that ∗ ≥ 0 if and only if β2(1 − τ 0w) ×
22A more detailed proof is presented in a technical appendix, available from the authors upon request.
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(qτ 0w − 1) ≥ 4(1 − β)χˆ . Note that the left-hand side of the condition is increasing in
τ 0w whenever τ 0w ≤ 0.5. It is, therefore, increasing in G. Furthermore, substituting τ 0w
from (25) reveals that the condition holds with equality if G = G. This concludes the
proof. 
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